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ADVENT OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW INTO THE CARIBBEAN: 
 In the 17th and 18th centuries as Britain expanded her influence 
throughout the world she took to her colonies all of her institutions – social, 
financial, religious and legal, inter alia, and established them along identical 
lines with those in the mother country.  With regard to the legal system, the 
Common Law of England became the Common Law of the particular colony, 
and the structure of the court system in large measure mirrored that of 
England with no regard to relevance or suitability to local conditions. 
 
(a) PRESERVATION OF THE COMMON LAW 
Some of the Caribbean islands and the mainland territory of Guyana  
conquered by the British were no exception.  They inherited all of the 
institutions and the legal system of England.  In some of the English-speaking 
territories of the Caribbean certain aspects of the Common Law of England 
were expressly preserved as the law of the colony by legislation.  In Guyana, 
for example, the Civil Law of Guyana Act, Cap. 6:011 passed on 1st January, 
1917 was intituled “An Act to codify certain portions of the Roman-Dutch Law 
of the State and in other matters to substitute the English Common Law and 
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Principles of Equity, along with certain English Statutory Provisions for the 
Roman-Dutch Law”.  Section 3(b) provides as follows: 
“the common law of Guyana shall be the common law of 
  England as at the date aforesaid including therewith the 
  doctrines of equity as then administered or at any time 
  hereafter administered by the courts of justice in England, 
  and the High Court shall administer the doctrines of equity 
  in the same manner as the High Court of Justice in England 
  administers them at the date aforesaid or at any time 
  hereafter”. 
 
 This Act was passed to codify certain portions of the Roman-Dutch 
Law which was applied in Guyana in relation to immovable property.  I shall 
refer to this more specifically later in the presentation. 
 The island of St. Lucia in like manner expressly provided for the 
common law of England to apply to certain aspects of the law of the then 
colony.  Article 917A of the Civil Code of St. Lucia, Cap. 242 is to this 
effect: 
“(1)  Subject to the provisions of this article, from and 
        after the coming into operation of this article the 
        Law of England for the time being relating to 
        contracts, quasi-contracts and torts shall mutatis 
        mutandis extend to this colony”. 
   This was applied in the case of Mendes v. Philbert2 when the Court of 
Appeal of the West Indies Associated States held that the effect of Art. 
917(A) of the Civil Code was to make the English common law doctrine of 
scienter part of the law of St. Lucia, and since this point was not raised at the 
trial where a respondent sued for damages for personal injuries arising from 
an attack from dogs, the magistrate’s order awarding the respondent 
damages was erroneous and would be set aside. 
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(b) STRUCTURE OF THE COURT SYSTEM: 
The English court structure in most instances was transported in toto into  
the Caribbean territories without reference to relevance, cultural patterns or 
size of the particular island or state.  Provision was made for magistrates’ 
courts, district courts and high courts.  All appeals from the high courts or 
supreme courts of the Caribbean territories went to the Privy Council in 
England, and in most cases this is still so.  In the middle of the 20th century 
there was established an intermediary court of appeal with a varied 
nomenclature - first the West Indian Court of Appeal, then with an attempt at 
federation, the Federal Supreme Court, and lastly the British Caribbean Court 
of Appeal.  With the advent of independence most of the states established 
their own courts of appeal and retained appeals to the Privy Council.  Guyana 
abolished appeals to the Privy Council in 1970. 
 There have been, still and will continue to be arguments for and 
against the retention of the Privy Council as the final court of appeal of the 
Caribbean region, and I shall return to this topic later in the presentation. 
 In some instances certain states of the Caribbean have established 
special courts to meet special needs in the particular society.  One example of 
this was the establishment of the Gun Court in Jamaica in the early 1970’s to 
deal with the alarming rise in crimes involving the use of firearms.  Family 
Courts have also been established in some Caribbean territories to adjudicate 
on all matters pertaining to the family.  Of course, there have been for several 
years in some territories, for instance, in Guyana, Juvenile Courts which were 
established to handle all matters affecting juveniles, and were presided over 
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by a magistrate who held the hearings of criminal offences committed by 
juveniles in camera.  Probation officers were utilised to carry out 
investigations of the juvenile’s family background with a view to determining 
punishment which invariably involved committal to a correctional and 
rehabilitation centre. 
 In Guyana there was also established a Land Court with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on petitions for declarations of title to land having regard to the 
Roman-Dutch system of conveyancing. 
 In the colonial era nearly if not all of the courts of the Caribbean 
colonies were presided over by English magistrates and judges mainly with 
little or no knowledge of local customs and cultural traditions.  They applied 
the English rules and laws rigidly and uncompromisingly sometimes with 
ridiculous results, e.g. there was provision in the laws of some states for 
deeming someone found wandering “a rogue and vagabond”, and imposing a 
term of imprisonment when all that he may have been guilty of was not having 
a home or a family. 
 The Caribbean courts during this period in our history also followed the 
rules of procedure of the English courts.  The English Rules of the Supreme 
Court formed the base upon which the rules of court of the colonies were 
founded.  In most instances these rules were taken verbatim from the English 
rules.  However, in some instances procedural rules were formulated to meet 
local conditions, e.g. in Guyana there are rules regulating the procedure for 
entering oppositions to the passing of conveyances for land which is based on 
the Roman-Dutch system, and is peculiar to Guyana.  Also peculiar to 
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Guyana and some other Caribbean territories were the rules permitting 
barristers-at-law to act as solicitors prior to the fusion of the profession.   
 
EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL ADAPTATION OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW TO 
LOCAL SITUATIONS 
 
 
(a) FAMILY LAW 
As in other areas of the law the English matrimonial rules were applied  
Inflexibly with sometimes catastrophic results.  The case of Henry v. Henry3 
which is a decision of the Supreme Court of Trinidad & Tobago Appellate 
Jurisdiction is an excellent example of the impact of the English common law 
on society in the Caribbean and the effects it can have on the lives of its 
people.  In that case a wife lawfully married under the provisions of the 
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance, Cap. 29, No. 4 
brought a complaint against her husband under the Separation and 
Maintenance Ordinance for maintenance on the grounds of his wilful neglect 
to maintain her.  The magistrate found the complaint proved and made an 
order.  The husband appealed.  At the hearing of the appeal further evidence 
was received from an expert witness in Islamic law and custom, which 
established that Muslim marriages are potentially polygamous.  It was held, 
(i) that the only kind of marriage that entitled the parties thereto to the 
remedies, adjudication and relief of the matrimonial law of England 
upon which the Trinidad and Tobago general law relating to 
marriage is based, is a marriage that is monogamous in the 
Christian sense of the term, and 
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(ii) that a Muslim marriage not being monogamous in the Christian 
sense of the term, the magistrate had no jurisdiction to make an 
order for maintenance in this case. 
A learned Chief Justice in the course of the judgment made this comment: 
  “It is a well-established principle of law that the only 
  kind of marriage that entitled the parties thereto to 
  the remedies, adjudication or relief of the matrimonial 
  law of England (which is the basis of our general law 
  relating to marriage) is a marriage that is monogamous 
  in the Christian sense of the term”. 
 He went on to refer to the oft-quoted dicta of Lord Penzance in the 
case of Hyde v. Hyde4 to the effect that marriage as understood in 
Christendom was defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others.  This will require reconsideration in 
changing times. 
 The decision turned mainly on the wording of the Muslim Marriage 
and Divorce Registration Ordinance which provided for the registration of 
Muslim marriages and divorces, but did not stipulate (unlike the Hindu 
Marriage Ordinance)  that a marriage solemnised between persons 
professing the Muslim faith shall be valid as if it had been solemnised in 
conformity with the provisions  
of the Marriage Ordinance which related to marriages between persons of 
the Christian religion. 
 It must have seemed incredible to nationals of a country whose 
marriage had been registered in accordance with the law to discover that that 
marriage was regarded as polygamous and not recognised because it did not 
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conform with the Christian and English concept of marriage and was 
“repugnant to local matrimonial law” (a quotation of Counsel for the appellant). 
 A court of similar jurisdiction in Trinidad and Tobago in the later case of 
Mohamed v. Mohamed5 did not depart from this position where on an 
application by a wife of a marriage registered under the same Muslim 
Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance for an order against her 
husband for maintenance for the children of the said marriage, it was held that 
even though, as for herself, the wife is not entitled to the remedies, 
adjudication and relief afforded by the matrimonial law applicable to 
monogamous unions in the Christian sense of the term, she nevertheless 
enjoyed a legally married status by the laws of Trinidad and Tobago, and the 
legitimation of the children of her marriage by statute had the effect of clothing 
her with the status of a mother within the meaning of the Infants Ordinance. 
 The anomaly thus created had the effect of denying a wife married 
under the Muslim faith the right to sue her husband for maintenance for 
herself not  
being regarded as a married woman within the meaning of such a term 
according to the English concept of marriage, but permitting her to sue her 
husband for maintenance for their children who were regarded as legitimate 
under the same Muslim Marriage and Divorce Registration Ordinance. 
 This was the impact of the English common law on Caribbean society, 
and a clear example of discrimination against a section of people born within 
our region and entitled to the protection of our laws.  Of course, we must be 
mindful of the fact that these cases were decided during colonial times and in 
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the pre-Independence era of the Caribbean, and may have been decided 
differently now with legislation which would have sought to correct the 
anomaly. 
 In most of the Caribbean territories English matrimonial law was 
applied, and the grounds for the dissolution of a marriage were the same as 
those in England with the exception of Guyana where there exists the Roman-
Dutch concept of malicious desertion which is desertion proceeding “ex 
malitia”, i.e., from design or pre-meditated determination.  The ratio decidendi 
in the case of Siebs v. Siebs6 indicates the influence of the concepts of 
English law on a Roman-Dutch concept when the Court of Appeal held that 
there was no difference in the state of mind required to found malicious 
desertion and that of the English doctrine of constructive desertion.  A Court 
of Appeal Judge in the course of his judgment made this comment: 
  “For my part, I can find no difference between the 
  state of mind required to found malicious desertion, 
  and that which must exist in the spouse whose 
  conduct leads the other spouse to depart from the 
  matrimonial home.  The object is the same; the 
  mode of achieving that object is different”. 
 
 Guyana still remains the only country in the region which has retained 
this peculiar concept of malicious desertion, and is at present no more than a 
nomenclature for the concept of desertion.  In the very near future it may fade 
into history when the sole ground for dissolution of a marriage will be its 
irretrievable breakdown based on a separation for a specified period. 
 
(b) LAW OF MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
 
As mentioned earlier the Civil Law of Guyana Act,  
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Cap. 6:017 sought to codify certain portions of the Roman-Dutch Law in 
relation to immovable property.  Section 3 (c) expressly provided that the 
English common law of real property shall not apply to immovable property in 
Guyana and Section 3 (d) is to this effect: 
  “There shall be as heretofore one common law for both 
  immovable and movable property, and all questions 
  relating to immovable property within Guyana and to 
  movable property subject to the law of Guyana shall be 
  adjudged, determined, construed and enforced, as far 
  as possible, according to the principles of the common 
  law of England applicable to personal property: with 
  certain provisos”. 
 
 The effect of this was that all English principles concerning personalty 
were now to be applied to immovable and movable property alike in Guyana.   
 The concept of the “chattel house” unknown to English law is a peculiar 
phenomenon of Caribbean society and most territories have given it statutory 
recognition.  Under Section 2 of the Summary Ejectment Ordinance, Cap. 
27, No. 17 of Trinidad and Tobago “premises” meant “lands, houses or 
other corporeal hereditaments, and includes chattel or movable houses”. In 
a case in 1963 the learned judge stated in his judgment that the manner of its 
statutory insertion indicated that  the chattel house had become a part of the 
common law of Trinidad and Tobago, [and] it seemed appropriate, therefore, 
to apply the principles developed by the courts in England to this locally 
important, if novel, off-shoot in the law of real property.  He held in that case, 
inter alia, that the house (the subject matter of the dispute) was a type of 
fixture which attracted a relaxation of the general rule as to annexation of 
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chattels to the soil and was consequently removable as a tenant’s fixture at 
the end of or during the term of the tenancy. 
 
(c) DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
 The doctrine of unjust enrichment came up for consideration before the 
Court of Appeal of Guyana in 1970 in the case of Peter Persaud and others 
v. Pln. Versailles & Schoon Ord. Ltd.,8 and as happened in England there 
were divergent views. One Justice of Appeal expressed grave doubt as to 
whether the law of unjust enrichment is part of the law of Guyana, while 
another felt that there was no impediment to the application of the doctrine as 
the jurisdiction of the High Court of Guyana is not fettered from itself 
developing and expanding the common law with the aid of the principles of 
equity in fitting cases. 
  
 This case concerned the deductions from their wages of amounts due 
by employees, the appellants, for food and drink consumed by them as 
members of a staff club, and payment for which they had authorised their 
employers, the respondents, to deduct from their wages.  The club was later 
closed, but the employers continued to make the deductions for outstanding 
amounts due by the employees to creditors of the club.  The appellants 
launched proceedings to recover the amounts thereby deducted. One Judge 
in the course of his judgment at page 130 had this to say: 
  “Underlying the law of restitution is the conception 
  that no one should unjustly enrich himself at the 
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  expense of his neighbour.  As I see it, I must march 
  with those in the vanguard of progress and try to 
  develop the law by means of the application of 
  equitable remedies in the dualism of common law 
  and equity which is sanctioned by and built into 
  our legal system – see S. 3 (B) of the Civil Law of 
  Guyana Ord. Cap. 2”.  
 
 
 One can never over-emphasise the urgency for the courts of our region 
to develop a jurisprudence of our own, by modifying or expanding the 
common law to meet local situations and the justice of a particular case.   
 
(d) CRIMINAL LAW 
 
(i)     STARE DECISIS 
 As in the civil jurisdiction of our courts the influence of the English law 
and precedent has been no less pervasive in the criminal law.  We inherited 
all of the English criminal offences, defences, and the jury system.  We have 
been throughout the years guided by their decisions, e.g. Section 3 of the 
Criminal Law (Offences) Act, Cap. 8:01 of Guyana9 first passed in 1894 
provides as follows: 
  “Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other 
  statute for the time being in force all the rules and 
  principles of the common law relating to indictable 
  offences and other criminal matters shall, as far as 
  they are applicable to the circumstances of Guyana, 
  be in force therein”. 
  Section 16 of the Criminal Law (Procedure) Act, Cap. 10:0210 also 
first passed in 1894 in like manner provided that the practice and procedure in 
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criminal causes and matters shall be the same as that in the High Court of 
Justice and the courts of assize and of gaol delivery in England.  However, 
within recent times in England most criminal offences have become statutory 
offences differing in some respects from ours and sometimes not relevant to 
our behavioural patterns.  There may be occasions when we find ourselves 
unable to follow judgments of the English courts which we feel were wrongly 
decided.  This view was expressed by a Judge of the Court of Appeal of 
Guyana in the case of The State v. Sookraj Evans11 where he held that the 
Guyana Court of Appeal should act on the principle that although for obvious 
reasons it will be predisposed to accept and normally will accept a judgment 
of the House of Lords on a point of English common law as correct and as our 
law, it has jurisdictional freedom and a constitutional judicial duty to hold 
differently, if the Court is convinced fully on just grounds that the principle or 
rule laid down in it or the declaration of what is not the common law, is 
misconceived and wrong. 
 
 
Opinions have been expressed that courts of the Commonwealth must 
feel free to develop and interpret common law principles as they seem fit 
having regard to local conditions and whether they consider particular 
decisions of the English courts wrongly decided, without being obliged to 
follow them because of statutory compulsion or to preserve judicial uniformity. 
   
 (ii)  ADMINISTRATION OF OATHS TO WITNESSES 
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 Oaths taken by witnesses have throughout the history of the English 
common law followed prescribed forms, and have been administered in 
conformity with Christian principles.  However, there have been cases 
decided in the English courts where witnesses have been permitted to swear 
to oaths in accordance with what is binding on their conscience. 
 In the Caribbean our courts have followed the format of and manner in  
which oaths are administered in England and which are based on the 
Christian religion.  With the advent of the Rastafarian religion in the Caribbean 
the Jamaican courts were called upon to determine whether the refusal of a 
trial judge to permit an accused to be sworn in a form which he considered 
binding on his conscience and which was not in the prescribed form, was 
wrong.  It arose in the case of R. v. Hines and King12 when an accused 
declined to be sworn in the form prescribed by S. 3 of the Oaths Law, Cap. 
264 of Jamaica which was identical in format with S. 2 of the Oaths, Act, 
1909 of England, and began “I swear by Almighty God ……….” His reason 
for refusing to be so sworn was that he professed the Rastafarian faith and 
would only consider himself bound by an oath in the form commencing “I 
swear by Almighty God, King Rastafari……” as he and other members of that 
faith regarded and worshipped the Emperor of Ethiopia as “the true and living 
God that sits on the throne of David”.  The trial judge refused to permit Hines 
to be sworn in a form other than that prescribed by S. 3 of the Oaths Law, 
Cap. 264 stating that as far as he knew an oath taken in the form in which 
Hines wished to take it was not lawful.  Hines rested his case, and was 
convicted.  On appeal, it was held that the trial judge erred in refusing to 
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permit Hines to be sworn in a form which Hines declared to be binding on his 
conscience and in so doing deprived the accused of his right to give sworn 
testimony in his defence and his convictions therefore could not stand. 
A Justice of Appeal in the course of his judgment made reference to S. 21 
(5) of the Constitution of Jamaica which enacts that: 
   
“No person shall be compelled to take any oath 
  which is contrary to his religion or belief or to take 
  any oath in a manner which is contrary to his 
  religion or belief”. 
 However, S. 3 of the Oaths Law Cap. 264 of Jamaica was based on 
and was identical in content to S. 2 of the Oaths Act, 1909. The learned 
Judge remarked that as far as those statutory enactments went the position in 
England and Jamaica appeared to be the same, but posed the question 
whether the prescribed statutory form and manner for the administration and 
taking of an oath was compulsory or permissive.  He observed that having 
regard to the multitude of different religious beliefs which exist in the world it is 
to be expected that an oath under the common law would take some of very 
many forms.  He traced the history of the present Jamaican statutory 
provision based throughout on English legislation, and concluded that there is 
nothing in the enactments which have been traced – English or Jamaican – 
which would have the effect of rendering invalid an oath administered or taken 
in a form and manner permissible under the common law.  He summed up his 
conclusions in relation to the appellant Hines in this way: 
  “…… However misguided one may think Hines to be in 
  his professed belief as a member of the Rastafarian sect 
  that the Emperor of Ethiopia is a Divine Being, the fact 
  remains that such is his professed belief and indeed the 
  professed belief of the sect to which he belongs.  The form 
  in which Hines wished to take the oath was consistent 
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  with that professed belief and declared by him to be  
  binding on his conscience…….” 
 
 This case exemplifies the impact of the English common law on local 
custom and religion not always negatively, but sometimes positively ensuring 
the development of our mores and the ethos of our own jurisprudence. 
 
 
ABOLITION OF APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL COURT OF APPEAL 
 
 It is apposite at this point to consider the desirability of developing a 
jurisprudence peculiar to our needs, culture, traditions and regional objectives.  
I think it is imperative that we pause and reflect on how appropriate certain 
aspects of the English common law and legal systems are to our region, and 
not follow the tried and beaten path of English precedent.  Inextricably tied to 
this laudable goal is the compunction to establish our own final court of 
appeal.  We have taken our own political, economic and social destinies into 
our own hands with the assumption of independent status in all but one or two 
of the Caribbean islands and the establishment of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Community.  Several years before these events we became a 
force to be reckoned with in the field of cricket being invincible against our 
former colonial masters, yet we cling tenaciously to a court thousands of miles 
away established in colonial times to consider and determine appeals from its 
colonies. 
 Several of England’s former colonies have severed the umbilical cord 
and established final courts of their own, but we in the Caribbean along with 
one or two other Commonwealth territories seem reluctant to leave the nest 
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and fly with our own wings. Happily, in April 2005 the Caribbean Court of 
Justice was inaugurated with two jurisdictions – original and appellate.  All of 
the member states of the English-speaking Caribbean together with Suriname 
and Haiti have acceded to the original jurisdiction having empowered the 
Court to apply and interpret the provisions of the economic treaty – the 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.  However, only three states have acceded 
to the appellate jurisdiction – Barbados, Guyana and Belize.  There have 
been recent press reports that Dominica will be delinking from the Privy 
Council, and will be the new member of the CCJ. 
This Court is still in its infancy being just eight years old, but the 
appointments procedure for the recruitment of judges has received 
commendation internationally.  The appointments are made by an 
independent Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission comprising 
representatives of the Regional Bar Associations, the Regional Public Service 
Commissions, the regional Universities, and civil society.  The governments of 
the Region have no control over the appointments, and judges sit on the 
Court in their personal capacities, and not as representatives of their country 
of birth.  They are appointed if they satisfy the required criteria, and are drawn 
from common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions if proficient in 
international law.  Only the appointment of the President of the Court requires 
the formal approval of the States upon a recommendation of the Commission. 
I think the time has come for the peoples of the Caribbean Region to 
take control of the administration of justice as has been the case in relation to 
other aspects of Regional responsibilities.  Who better can judge whether a 
chattel house on blocks in the gap in St. Lawrence, Barbados, belongs to the 
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tenant or the owner of the land or whether a member of the Rastafarian 
religion in Kingston, Jamaica or Kingstown, St. Vincent, ought to swear by Jah 
or the financial implications of holding a box hand in Guyana or sou-sou as it 
is called in Trinidad and Tobago?  Only nationals of the Caribbean know what 
this means. 
 
 This fact was highlighted by the Privy Council in the case of John and 
Others v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Dominica13 when it held, 
inter alia, that questions of the evaluation of evidence are essentially matters 
for a local appellate court and are not matters upon which, generally 
speaking, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would presume to differ 
from that court, whatever view their Lordships might have been disposed to 
take had the appeal in question initially come before them. 
   We shall have failed in our duty to ourselves and to the future 
generations of Caribbean jurists if we do not establish our own judicial 
institutions and develop our own jurisprudence thereby bequeathing to those 
yet unborn a heritage of which they can be justly proud. 
   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Whatever the shortcomings and deficiencies of the common law it was 
an invaluable legacy inherited by Britain’s former colonies, and has been a 
unifying force among countries that share the same legal system.  Its 
influence may be slowly waning even in the motherland that gave it birth as 
time and again it has yielded to statute which threatens to obliterate it 
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completely.  English law is fast becoming codified as the legislature seeks the 
medium of a statute to correct defects which surface in the common law and 
to provide remedies where none existed before. 
 The influence of Britain on her former colonies is strong, and despite 
their independent status many countries of the Commonwealth very often 
follow verbatim the wording of English statutes in drafting their own.  In spite 
of and maybe because of the varied mosaic of cultures, traditions and 
customs of the countries which share the same history of English colonialism, 
the common law and the body of precedent built up around it has been 
enriched in its development, and made strong, and dynamic.  May it always 
remain so even in a world which is changing rapidly and moving inexorably 
forward. 
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